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INTRODUCTION
To date, relatively little academic attention hasfocused on considering the interaction betweenprisoners’ families and law. From the moment a
family member is arrested, law underpins and shapes the
day-to-day lived experience of many prisoners’ partners
and children, initially in relation to the police and the trial
process, then later during the prison sentence and in
relation to subsequent arrangements for release. Prisoners’
families are affected not only by the criminal law and
sentencing law, but also by family law, child protection law,
data protection legislation, housing and welfare law. The
research and debates, however, tend to be rooted in
sociology or social work, not legal analysis.
THE CURRENT POLICY CONTEXT
Since the 1960’s research has documented the
challenges faced by prisoners’ partners, children and other
kin, including financial difficulties; lack of information and
support; housing problems and the effects of social
stigmatisation. At the same time examples of innovative
good practice in encouraging family ties have been
identified and disseminated, such as extended visits,
storybook projects, and play schemes (see eg, Light R,
(1993), “Why support prisoners’ family-tie groups?”, The
Howard Journal, vol 32, no 4, 322; Light R, (1989) (ed),
Prisoners’ families: what are the issues?, Bristol Centre for
Criminal Justice; Light R, (1992), Prisoners’ families: keeping
in touch, Bristol Centre for Criminal Justice: Boswell G &
Wedge P, (2001), Imprisoned fathers and their children London,
Jessica Kingsley Publishers).
In the last 10 years, there has been growing recognition
of the diversity of prisoners’ family and kin networks,
including discussion of the needs of the families of Black
and Asian inmates; partners in gay relationships, and the
partners of older prisoners (see eg, Light R, (1995), “Black
and Asian prisoners’ families”, The Howard Journal, vol 34,
209–17; Paylor I & Smith D, (1994) “Who are prisoners’
families?”, Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law (2),
131–44; Peelo M, Stewart J, Stewart G, and Prior A,
(1991) “Women partners of prisoners”, The Howard
Journal, vol 30, no 4, 311–27). This research has
challenged the stereotype of prisoners’ families as usually
comprising a male inmate, young female partner and
several young children. A recent BBC2 documentary,
“Prisoners’ families: the silent sentence” shown on June 1,
2004, illustrated another aspects of prisoners’ family ties:
that is, the impact on prisoners’ parents. As a consequence
of the “imprisonment binge” and especially the rapid
growth in women’s imprisonment during the past decade,
more and more grandparents find themselves caring for
prisoners’ children: the needs of grandparent caregivers
have been debated and discussed in the USA for quite
some time, but the needs this group are only now being
recognised in the UK (See for example the guide for
grandparent guidegivers published by Islington council.
For an outline of the issues, see Cox C, (1999), To
grandmother’s house we go and stay: perspectives on custodial
grandparents, New York, Springer; Dressel P & Barnhill S K,
(1994), “Reframing gerontological thought and practice:
the case of grandmothers with daughters in prison”, The
Gerontologist, vol 34, No 5, 685–91; Minkler M & Roe K,
(1993), Grandmothers as caregivers: raising children of the Crack
Cocaine Epidemic, Newbury Park CA, Sage).
It is increasingly being recognised that family ties play a
fundamental role in preventing prisoners reoffending,
assisting in prisoners’ successful community re-entry and
ultimately leading to desistance from crime (see eg,
Ditchfield J, (1994) Family ties and recidivism, Home Office
Research Bulletin No 36: Maruna S, (2001), Making good:
how ex-convicts reform and rebuild their lives, American
Psychological Association; Maruna S & Immarigeon R,
(2004), After crime and punishment: pathways to offender
reintegration, Cullompton, Willan). A number of studies,
such as those by Ditchfield and the Social Exclusion Unit,
have emphasied the fundamental importance of a stable
family in order not only to prevent reoffending but also to
minimise the criminogenic effect of a parent’s
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imprisonment on children. This has revitalised the debate
about the provision of appropriate services and support for
families with one member in prison: the probation service
has shifted away from work with “uncoerced clients” and
voluntary sector organisations are now a significant
resource for families.
Whilst the value of maintaining supportive family ties is
officially recognised, the practical day-to-day realities of
promoting and maintaining these ties can challenge even
the most devoted family member. At a time when the
prison population is higher than ever, the number of non-
legal visits to prisons has dropped by up to a third (this has
been considered by Broadhead J, ‘“Visitors welcome – or
are they?”, New Law Journal, January 11, 2002, 5: Prison
Factfile, Prison Reform Trust, March 2004, London). Julian
Broadhead suggests that this decline is due to several
factors, including practical problems pre-booking visits;
unnecessary strip-searching; prisoners being held a long
way from home; and, too often, the perception that visitors
to prisons are regarded by prison staff as a nuisance.
Contradictions such as this emerge again and again.
Promoting family life has to be balanced against the
interests of prison security; facilitating community re-entry
has to be balanced against the societal desire to see
criminals punished; the desirability of parents maintaining
contact with their children has to be balanced against the
potential negative effects of children spending time with
their parents in a prison environment. Policies and
practices vary from prison to prison. Whilst there are many
examples of good practice and innovative programmes
operating in prisons, ranging from extended visits to play
schemes and Relate courses, there are also more negative
experiential accounts of difficulties in obtaining
information, hostility from prison staff, poor or non-
existent public transport links and inadequate visiting
facilities.
In women’s prisons, motherhood itself justifies prisons
developing new, family-friendly initiatives such as all-day
visits: for male inmates, family-friendly projects are
justified not purely by reference to parenthood but to
research into reoffending (for a brief discussion of recent
initiatives to support family ties for women prisoners, see
Carlen P and Worrall A, (2004), Analysing women’s
imprisonment, Cullompton, Willan, 63–6). This reinforces
gendered ideologies of women’s care. The emphasis on
desistance and reintegration of prisoners puts the focus
squarely on the inmate, rather than on the family: families
are supported because they can play a key role in
resettlement, not because of their need for support as a
family in their own right. Taken to the extreme, an
approach to families based on desistance also raises the the
dilemma of the criminal family: if the family is supportive
of crime and not desistance, are they undeserving of
support?
The gender issues here are also problematic. Research
has shown that, regardless of the gender of the inmate, it is
women who bear the burdens of caring. Thus when we are
talking about “prisoners’ families” we are talking about
children, and also mainly about women. In one of my
previous articles I discussed how prisoners’ partners are
dependent on the voluntary sector, and how supporting
self-help groups, whilst apparently desirable, can reinforce
women’s caring role and oblige women to care not only for
their imprisoned family members but also for other
members of prisoners’ families. Current initiatives which
link family ties with desistance recognise family ties merely
as a means to an end. Thus women become co-opted into
the process of prisoner resettlement: women become
responsible for helping ex-offenders “go straight” and they
are supported because of their instrumental value, not
because of any commitment to maintaining families for
their own sake. This reinforces women’s roles as law-
abiding carers, and, as the term “prisoner’s family”
suggests, foregrounds and prioritises the prisoner and not
the family.
PRISONERS’ FAMILIES AND THE LAW
These issues carry through into discussion of prisoners’
families and the law. Families are always “in the shadow of
the prison” and the prisoner. The legal process is prisoner-
focused and there is little official recognition of the needs
of prisoners’ families in their own right. The research
evidence indicates that prisoners’ families usually feel
peripheral in legal decision-making. For example, for
under-18s and those sentenced to DTTO’s there is a
mandatory requirement that prison governors ensure,
where appropriate, that families are given the opportunity
to contribute to the sentence planning process: for adult
prisoners this is left to the discretion of individual
establishments (Paul Goggins, Minister for Prisons and
Probation, Hansard, January 20, 2004).
In 2002, the Report of the Social Exclusion Unit
Reducing re-offending by ex-prisoners, concluded that:
“at every stage of a prisoner’s movement through the criminal
justice system, families are largely left out of the decision-
making process and rarely get the opportunity to support
prisoners effectively.”
Where families wish to challenge the decisions of
administrative bodies, a number of legal avenues are open
to then. The Prisons Ombudsman, Stephen Shaw, is not
empowered to deal with complaints from families:
however, judicial review and proceedings under the
Human Rights Act 1998 provide a mechanism for
challenge, as does the European Court of Human Rights.
An ongoing debate in prison law, and one which has led to
a number of challenges under the Human Rights Act and
in the European Court of Human Rights, concerns the
extent to which prisoners retain (or lose) civil rights upon
incarceration (see eg, Cheney D, Dickson R, Skilbeck R, 3
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Uglow S & John Fitzpatrick, (2001), Criminal Justice and the
Human Rights Act 1998, 2nd ed, Jordans, 194).
As Deborah Cheney and others put it:
“it would be untenable to consider that human rights should
be suspended at the gates of every prison and reactivated only
when a prisoner takes that first step back to freedom”.
The classic statement on prisoners’ retention of rights is
that of Lord Wilberforce in Raymond v Honey [1983] 1 AC
1, subsequently approved by the House of Lords in Simms
[2002] 2 AC 115:
“a convicted prisoner....retains all civil rights which are not
taken away expressly or by necessary implication”.
I would suggest that an equally valid question is “To what
extent do the rights of the families of prisoners survive the
sentence of imprisonment?” It is tempting to argue that
family members, since they are not convicted, retain all
their civil rights and freedoms. In his handbook A human
rights approach to prison management, published by the
International Centre for Prison Studies, Andrew Coyle
writes:
“People who are sent to prison lose the right to free movement
but retain other rights as human beings. One of the most
important of these is the right to contact with their families.
As well as being a right for the prisoner, it is equally a right
for the family members who are not in prison. They retain the
right of contact with their father or mother, son or daughter,
brother or sister who has been sent to prison.”
However, some recent cases, such as those on artificial
insemination and mother-and-baby units, raise interesting
questions of the rights, not only of prisoners but also of
family members, and how these rights are to be balanced.
In The Queen on the Application of Mellor v Secretary of State
for the Home Department [2001] 3 WLR 533, the Court of
Appeal upheld a judgment by Forbes J dismissing an
application from a prisoner who was seeking access to
artificial insemination. At the time of the judgment, Gavin
Mellor was serving a life sentence, having been convicted of
murder in 1995. According to the judgment, the tariff
element of his sentence is due to expire in 2006, although
it is possible that he may be granted temporary release this
year. His wife, whom he married in prison in 1997, will be
31 when his tariff expires in February 2006. Mellor was
challenging Home Office policy which, whilst not
operating a blanket ban on artificial insemination, allows
access to appropriate facilities only in exceptional
circumstances. Mellor claimed that the refusal to allow him
access to AI facilities breached his right to respect for
private and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR, and his
right to marry and found a family under Article 12.
The court rejected Mellor’s claim, arguing that one of
the purposes of imprisonment was to punish the criminal
by depriving him of certain rights and pleasures which he
could only enjoy at liberty, including the enjoyment of
family life, the exercise of conjugal rights and the right to
found a family. In his judgment, Lord Phillips argued that a
policy which generally accorded prisoners the right to
conceive children by AI would “raise difficult ethical
questions and give rise to legitimate public concern”, and
he discussed the difficulties of creating a de facto single-
parent family, contending that it is:
“legitimate, and indeed desirable, that the state should
consider the implications of children being brought up in
those circumstances when deciding whether or not to have a
general policy of facilitating the artificial insemination of the
wives of prisoners or of wives who are themselves prisoners.”
Professor John Williams, in his thoughtful article about
the case, discusses this “natural consequences of
imprisonment argument”, and also explores the court’s
reasoning concerning the welfare of the child and the
problems of guaranteeing equal treatment for male and
female inmates: if AI were granted to male inmates, the
same facilities would have to be made available to females
(Williams J, (2002), “Have the courts got it right? The
Queen on the application of Mellor v Secretary of State for the
Home Department, Child and Family Law Quarterly, vol 14, No
2).
He points out that the explicit denial of prisoners’ rights
to have children appears to have no authority, and
contradicts Prison Rule 4. However, the European Court
of Human Rights has not yet found a violation of the
ECHR where the right of prisoners to procreate was an
issue (see Proctor P, “Procreating from prison: evaluating
British prisoners’ right to artificially inseminate their wives
under the United Kingdom’s new Human Rights Act and
the 2001 Mellor case”, Georgia Journal of International and
Comparative Law, Winter 2003.
Of course, if prisoners were allowed conjugal visits then
there would be no need to seek access to alternative means
of conception: however, as Williams points out, the
necessary privacy required by such visits could endanger
the security of the prison. The same, however, is not true
of AI, which offers a method by which a prisoner can
exercise his right to found a family which is compatible
with the “exigencies of the institutional environment” (see
Williams, 2002, above). Whilst purporting to be following
Simms, in fact the court turned Simms on its head: instead
of accepting that, in Lord Steyn’s words, “a .... prisoner
...retains all civil rights which are not taken away expressly
or by necessary implication”, Lord Phillips in Mellor seems
to suggest that the state’s interest in restricting rights is a
necessary consequence of impriosnment, which can only
be successfully challenged if disproportionate. John
Williams is equally dismissive of relying on concerns that it
would be inherently problematic to grant access to male
inmates because then such access would have to be granted
to women, arguing that “to deny a right to somebody
simply on the basis that another person may be denied it4
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does not rationally further the cause of equal
opportunities.”
In an interesting article referred to above, the American
academic Pollybeth Proctor considers the impact of the
HRA and the Mellor case, with reference to the comparative
constitutional position in the USA. She argues that close
scrutiny of English jurisprudence and societal values, as
well as Convention case law and article provisions, provides
ample justification for the understanding of the right to
procreate as envisaged in Mellor. She argues that the court
in Mellor displayed a commitment to upholding the
obligations of the HRA, and concldues that the denial of
permission in Mellor “does not signify a breach of the
United Kingdom’s pledge under the HRA, but rather a
cautious and thorough evaluation of their own legal
traditions, as well as a fair understanding of the obligations
underlying the Act”.
In contrast, John Williams refers to the policy as “the
constructive sterilisation of prisoners” and argues that the
policy as it stands, as accepted in Mellor, does not provide
the appropriate level of respect for prisoners’ rights. This
view of the Mellor decision is shared by Livingstone and
others, who refer to it as “a particularly regressive
approach to prisoners’ legal rights”, arguing that “the level
of deprivation which is legitimated by a sentence of
imprisonment is considerably harsher [in the UK] than in
other countries in Europe” (Owen T, Livingstone S &
Macdonald A, (2003), Prison law, 3rd ed, Oxford University
Press).
The Mellor case was brought by a prisoner in relation to
his own rights, not that of his partner, although as Mellor
pointed out in his initial letter of application, his wife also
has a right to found a family. Article 8 appears to protect de
facto family life: under Article 12, it could be argued that,
following the decision of the ECHR in X & Y v Switzerland
(1978) 13 DR 241, if the applicants are married they have
therefore founded a family. Depending on how “founding
a family” is defined, if a male prisoner is denied access to
facilities for AI, then in order to exercise her own rights his
partner would either have to have sex with someone other
than her husband, or conceive through formal or informal
AID, and thus bear a child of whom her husband would
not be the biological father. Thus, the partners of prisoners
denied access to AI could themselves challenge the policy
on the grounds that their own rights are being infringed.
That said, in the autumn of 2003 the wife of an inmate
denied AI failed in an application for judicial review.
Lorraine Dickson, herself an ex-prisoner, is the wife of a
mandatory lifer whom she befriended via the prison
penfriend scheme. Her husband will not be eligible to
apply for release on licence until 2009, by which time she
will be 51. Whilst her barrister, Flo Krause, argued that
there were “exceptional circumstances” why AI facilities
should be provided, Pitchford J said that the Prison Service
were justified in refusing such facilities, and in taking into
account that their relationship had not been tested outside
the prison; the “violent circumstances” of Kirk Dickson’s
offence (he killed a man in a fight); and the fact that he
would not be with the child during a large part of the
child’s formative years. Lorraine Dickson already has three
children by other relationships, and the judge refused to
accept that the couple’s desire to have a child “trumped all
other considerations.” In contrast to the approach of the
courts in these cases, other inmates serving long sentences
have been granted access to AI on the grounds that their
wives would be too old to conceive on their release,
including in one case, a drug smuggler serving a 17-year
sentence (“Prisoners take up their right to father children
from prison”, Sunday Times, December 15, 2002, 12).
In reflecting on these cases, it is not easy to explain why
the partner of a prisoner can lose her own right to found a
family as a consequence of being married to a prisoner,
since prisoners’ partners have not been convicted and
imprisoned. It is, however, well-established in the
criminological research literature that prisoners’ family
members are frequently treated as “guilty by association,”
stigmatised and taking on a share of the “spoiled identity”
of the imprisoned family member (see eg Social Exclusion
Unit (2002) Reducing re-offending by ex-prisoners, London,
Social Exclusion Unit; Codd H, (1998) “Prisoners’
families: the ‘forgotten victims,’”Probation Journal, vol 45,
no3, 148–54; Codd H, (2000), “Age, role changes and
gender power in family relationships: the experiences of
older female partners of male prisoners,” Women & Criminal
Justice, vol 12, issue 2/3, 63–93; Codd H, (2002) “The ties
that bind: feminist perspectives on self-help groups for
prisoners’ partners”, Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, vol
41, no 4, 334–47; Codd H, (2003) “Women inside and
out: prisoners’ partners, women in prison and the struggle
for identity”, Internet Journal of Criminology.
http://www.flashmousepublishing.com).
Is this what is happening here? In the Mellor judgment,
Lord Phillips cited the case of X v UK (1975) 2 D&R 105
(cited in the Mellor judgment), a case concerning the denial
of conjugal rights, and concluded that “a lawfully convicted
prisoner is responsible for is own situation and cannot
complain on that account that his right to found a family
has been infringed.” Could this be applied to claims by
prisoners’ partners? In both of these cases the women
married serving prisoners, and in both of these cases the
judges referred to the fact that their relationships had not
existed outside the prison. The prison service policy
suggests that the situation would be different if the
marriage had been pre-existing.
More theoretically, from a feminist criminological
perspective, are both Tracey McColl [Gavin Mellor’s wife]
and Lorraine Dickson transgressive females, who are
deemed unsuitable mothers through either their own
criminality [Dickson] or, in the case of Tracey McColl,
through deviating from the appropriate behaviour of a
prison employee by falling in love with an inmate? Is there 5
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an implied moral judgment here on the wisdom of
marrying prisoners? Both men in these cases were
mandatory lifers: are the courts distinguishing between
murderers and other offenders? The Court of Appeal in
Mellor argued that it was better for the well-being of
children to be in contact with both parents. I would
suggest that it is important to recognise here that although,
on a day-to-day basis, one parent is living away from the
family home in restrictive circumstances, it does not
necessarily follow that they are not in contact with their
children, or exercising a meaningful parental role, albeit
remotely. After all, there are a number of innovative
projects in operation which operate specifically to promote
contact between inmates and their children.
Leading on from this, it is useful to remind ourselves of
the research evidence, which links family responsibilities
and strong family ties to desistance from crime: thus,
allowing an inmate to found a family through AI may, in the
long-term, contribute to future successful community re-
entry (see eg the report of the Social Exclusion Unit on
reoffending, above, and Williams (2002) above). Although
not explicitly stated in Mellor, it is possible that the court
were considering the financial implications of creating a
child in terms of the potential burden on the state:
however, Lorraine Dickson has argued that she is more
than capable of supporting a child financially, and she has
also arranged shared childcare so that she could work. It
could be argued that these judgments reflect a stereotypical
concept of family financial support which constructs men
as the main household breadwinners: there is nothing to
indicate that either of the women in these cases would not
be capable of financially supporting any child (and if
prisoners earned realistic wages for their work, then a
proportion of those wages could be paid as child
maintenance).
The situation in relation to mothers who wish to keep
their babies with them in prison is rather more complex,
but potentially more encouraging in terms of a recognition
of the rights of the children of prisoners. In Re P&Q (R(P)
v Secretary of State for the Home Department, R (Q) v Secretary of
State for the Home Department [2001] 1 WLR 2002), a case
heard a few months after Mellor, the Court of Appeal had
to consider a challenge brought by two serving prisoners
against the policy of the Prison Service [PSO 4801] which
prohibited babies from remaining with their mothers in
prison after they had reached the age of 18 months. It was
held that the Prison Service was entitled to have a policy of
this kind, but was not entitled to operate this policy in a
rigid fashion, insisting that all children must leave a mother
and baby unit by the age of 18 months
“however catastrophic the separation might be in the case of a
particular child, however unsatisfactory the alternative
placement available for the child, and however attractive the
alternative solution of combining daycare outside prison.”
The court reached this conclusion for two reasons. The
first was because the policy’s own declared aim was to
promote the welfare of the child. The second ground was
that, on the proper application of Article 8, there might be
rare exceptions where the interests of mother and child
coincide and outweigh any other considerations arising
from the fact of the mother’s imprisonment and the
implications of any relaxation in the policy on the
individual prison and the Prison Service generally.
The decision in this case was greeted by Vanessa Munro
in her article as “throwing open current prison service
policy and practice in this area to critical scrutiny” (Munro
V, (2002), “The emerging rights of imprisoned mothers
and their children”, Child and Family Law Quarterly, vol 14,
no 3). In this case, under the Children Act the court was
legally bound to consider the best interests of the child as
the paramount consideration: as the ECHR has recently
said in Yousef v The Netherlands [2003] 1 FLR 210 (at para
73): “If any balancing of interests is necessary, the interests
of the child must prevail.” Vanessa Munro argued that this
decision had broad-ranging implications, and she
identified potential implications for sentencing policy, the
rights of imprisoned fathers and the administration of
mother and baby units. Since this decision, however, there
have been several judicial review applications challenging
the exercise of the discretion, one of the most publicised
being that of Claire Frost.
In Claire F v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2004] EWHC 111 (Fam), the Prison Service had initially
decided to separate her from her baby Lia-Jade at the age
of nine months, rather than move them both to a different
mother-and-baby unit until the baby reached 18 months,
having taken the view that separation was better “earlier
rather than later.” The report of the judicial review
decision indicates what can only be described as a shocking
lack of professionalism on the part of the social worker
who was responsible for representing the baby’s interests
at the Separation Board: she only became involved with the
case on the day of the meeting, had not seen any relevant
papers prior to arrival at the prison, and was described by
Munby J as being “woefully unprepared for the task in
hand.”
Munby J took the view that, in this situation, the Prison
Service should have adjourned the hearing (see “Making
sure the child is heard”, a lecture by the Hon Mr Justice
Munby to the National Youth Advocacy Service on
February 5, 2004 published in two parts in Amicus Curiae at
(2004) issue 52, 2–8, and issue 53, 3–8). Munby J stressed
the procedural unfairness in the decision-making process
and quashed the decision to remove the baby at nine
months, ruling it was a matter for the Prison Service to
reconsider, and stressing the need for appropriate
representation of the interests of the child. As a
consequence, the baby was sent to live with her
grandparents in May 2004 when she was 16 months old:
Claire Frost has since been transferred to Askham Grange,6
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the prison to which she had initially requested a transfer so
the baby could stay with her up to the age of 18 months.
There is much which is thought-provoking about this
case, and R(D) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2003] 1 FLR 979. In the public lecture referred to above,
which was given shortly after his judgment in the Claire
Frost case, Munby J argued that, in order to comply with
the Convention, the Prison Service, or any other
administrative decision-maker, has to ensure that the
child’s interests are adequately represented. He ends his
detailed and through exposition of the law in “Making sure
the child is heard” as follows:
“So I end where, in a sense, I began: with Article 8. It is
fundamental to everything we do as professionals concerned
with children and their families. It is something we all need
to take very seriously, more seriously, perhaps, than sometimes
we do. Unless we do, the voice of the child will not be heard.”
These mother-and-baby cases, in contrast with the
artificial insemination cases, demonstrate the beginning of
judicial recognition of the voices of family members in
prison decision-making. The Children Act requires the
interests of the child to be paramount. Does this,
therefore, mean that in the future, issues of the impact of
prison service decisions on prisoners’ children may be
more readily brought to court? It is encouraging to read
the text of Munby J’s public lecture, when he reiterates the
importance of listening to children. Broader issues exist in
relation to the appropriateness of prison for women with
young children, but discussion of potential alternatives,
such as half-way houses, is outside the scope of this paper.
CONCLUSIONS
The term “prisoner’s family” defines the family in
relation to the inmate, and its usage could be challenged
for that reason. However, it is appropriate when talking
about law, since prisoners’ families interactions with the
law are governed by the courts’ views of prisoners and their
rights. Prisoners’ partners become subject to an array of
moral and social judgments when they seek to challenge
Prison Service decisions, and the courts have not yet
reconciled balancing the rights of family members with the
interests of the Prison Service [or NOMS as it has
become]. The cases involving babies indicate that at least
certain judges are keen to preserve childrens’ rights under
Article 8: however, in the Re P & Q and Re Claire F cases, the
judge was minded to maintain the discretionary power of
the prison service in these matters.
The efforts of campaigners such as Mark Leech, and
organisations such as Liberty and the Prison Reform Trust,
have sought to encourage and facilitate prisoners’ access to
the courts in order to enforce their rights but the
possibilities for legal challenges to preserve the rights of
families have not yet been fully realised. The potential is
there for the courts to adopt a rights-based approach to
prisoners’ families which challenges social stigmatisation
and exclusion and which avoids punishing prisoners’
partners and children: whether this will happen remains to
be seen.
• This article is taken from the text of a lecture given at
the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies on June 7,
2004.
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